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| Direct Costs (Million $) |
Avoided Costs (Million $) |
|
| BENEFITS (No Change from Restoring River) | -- | -- |
| COSTS | ||
| Implementation Costs | ||
| Dam Removal | 25.6 | |
| Current Dam O&M | 33.6 | |
| Current F&W Restoration Costs | 194.4 [1] | |
| Opportunity Costs | ||
| Power | ||
| Replacement Power (Value of Lost Power) | 115.6 [2] | |
| Transportation | ||
| Increased Private Cost | 0.1 | |
| Lost Power from Locks | 0.8 [4] | |
| Port Property Tax Subsidy | 1.3 [5] | |
| Irrigation | ||
| Net Crop Value | 1.9 [3] | |
| Purchase of Irrigated Farms | 2.0 [3] | |
| Lost Power Generation from Water Use | 0.5 [6] | |
| Pumping Subsidy from Electric Ratepayers | 0.5 [7] | |
| Crop Subsidies | 0.8 [8] | |
| TOTALS | 145.2 | 231.9 |
| NET COST (Direct Cost Minus Avoided Cost) | -86.7 |
Because Table 1 uses the same numbers presented in the ONRC report, it also adds up to the ONRC bottom line, a benefit (a reduction in negative benefits) of $86.7 million from dam breaching. The numbers in brackets refer to our comments, provided below, on the validity of many of the entries in the table.
The first line of the table reflects the ONRC assumption that there would be no change in gross benefits from restoring the river. That is, the ONRC assumes that the same amount of electricity would still be available for consumption (although now from alternative sources), that irrigated farmers would be made whole (by being bought out), and that grain would still be transported to market (although by alternative modes). As noted above recreational benefits and cost have not been included in the analysis. Neither has the value of increased salmon been evaluated as a benefit, although that increased value is clearly the intended policy objective. Such an exclusion has the result of underestimating the potential benefits of breaching.
The two cost columns distinguish between "direct costs" and "avoided costs." "Direct costs" are payments necessary to accomplish the restoration alternative (such as the cost of breaching the dams or purchasing irrigated farms). "Avoided costs" represent savings that result from restoring the river. Such savings result because some payments (such as current dam operation and maintenance (O&M) , or if one accepts the ONRC view, the majority of salmon recovery expenses) that would otherwise be necessary to maintain the current state of the river, are no longer necessary if the dams are breached.
The table also distinguishes between "implementation costs," which are actual payments to achieve restoration of the river (e.g. the cost of earthmoving to breach dams) versus "opportunity costs," which are benefits given up as the result of restoration (e.g. less hydropower, lower harvest of some crops.)
The IEAB found Table 1 useful as an aid in understanding the relationship among the various numbers presented in the ONRC report. With this as a start, concerns were identified about the way the particular numbers were used in the ONRC analysis, and sometimes about the magnitude of the number used. Our comments in the section that follows are keyed to the numbers in brackets in Table 1. These comments explain in more detail our substantial concerns about particular assumptions used by the authors of the ONRC study.
[1] Current Expenditures for Fish & Wildlife Recovery
This number is the single most important number in the ONRC analysis. The rest of our comments are far less significant in magnitude of effect compared to this. The authors themselves note (on page 11, in a footnote on page 13, and in the appendices on page 28) that their results depend crucially on the correct magnitude and interpretation of this number. They use this $194.4 million number, together with $33.6 million of current dam O&M, as the measure of current annual cost of the dams, which they then allocate to the various uses (hydropower, navigation and irrigation). The ONRC study assumes that if the dams are removed, then these costs will go away.
However, it does not appear reasonable to assume that all of the $194.4 million fish and wildlife restoration costs will be avoided with removal of the four lower Snake dams. Removing these four dams will not really "restore the river to free-flowing condition", because Idaho Power Company dams, Dworshak Dam, and a large number of irrigation water users will continue to store and divert water. The ONRC report quotes a study that concludes that if the Lower Snake River is restored, there is an 80 to 100 percent probability that spring and summer Chinook salmon populations can recover to the levels of the 1960's within 24 years. However, current indications from the PATH (Plan for Analyzing and Testing Hypotheses) process are that even under the best of conditions, recovery will be neither fast nor assured. If this is the case, It is likely that there will be continued spending on fish recovery, and it is highly unlikely that spending on fish monitoring, research and habitat restoration will stop even if fish numbers recover.
Of the $194.4 million cost attributed to current fish recovery efforts in the ONRC study, $164 million consists of the value of lost hydropower generation due to restrictions on water flows, spill requirements, temperature controls, and timing of releases. As the fish-related flow regime reduces the amount and value of hydropower generation, BPA or regional utilities purchase power from other, more expensive sources. The ONRC uses BPA's estimated cost of $164 million for hydropower costs associated with "fish restrictions" on the system.
ONRC assumes that this hydropower cost will disappear when the dams are breached. While ONRC does recognize that its results crucially depend on this assumption, that dependence is not noted among the results highlighted in the report. We think that this treatment of hydropower cost is a major flaw in the ONRC report. The hydropower costs of removing the four lower Snake River dams depend upon: (1) the degree to which that removal would alleviate needs for water releases to assist fish in the Snake and Columbia rivers, thus allowing more hydropower generation to occur on Columbia River and upper Snake River dams; and (2) the amount of power generation sacrificed on the lower Snake. ONRC must be assuming that the loss of hydropower at the breached Snake River dams would be fully compensated by an increase in power production elsewhere, and that hydropower production on the Columbia and upper Snake would increase markedly as spring seasonal flow requirements are diminished. But ONRC provides absolutely no information on the relative magnitudes of these two factors to support the assumption that $164 million in hydropower costs associated with "fish constraints" will be saved (i.e., disappear) when the four dams are removed. To the extent that breaching does not recover all $164 million of these costs, because generation is impossible at breached dams and some "fish constraints" continue on the remaining dams, this difference would come directly off of ONRC's $86.7 million bottom line.
We would need more concrete information to fully assess the plausibility of ONRC's assumption that the $164 million cost of "fish constraints" will be saved when the Snake River dams are removed. One source of such information is the 1994 comprehensive analysis performed by the Bonneville Power Administration, US Army Corps of Engineers, and US Bureau of Reclamation in their Columbia River System Operation Review (SOR). In addition, the hydropower modeling work currently being done for the Lower Snake River Juvenile Salmon Migration Feasibility Study will provide updated estimates of the effect of dam breaching on hydropower generation, and will attempt to track which current fish and wildlife expenditures are avoidable. Thus, the ONRC assumptions should, hopefully, be subject to testing through the DREW process.
It should also be noted that not all of the estimated $33.6 million of O&M expenditures on dams would be eliminated. Substantial maintenance expenditures for mothballing of the dams in a breaching scenario would be necessary, although unquantified at this time.
[2] Replacement Value of Lost Energy The assumptions on which this number is based comprise the second largest contributor to the ONRC's bottom line. The study asserts that there is currently a surplus of power in the Pacific Northwest (page 18), and that the power currently available from the Snake River dams (7,227,000 MWH) could be replaced from alternative generation sources at a cost of 1.6 cents per kWh. Since the ONRC presents no alternative rate scenarios for the future, it presumably is projecting that the 1.6 cent replacement cost rate is applicable in perpetuity.
There are two problems with these assertions. First, the most recent projections by the Bonneville Power Administration indicate that the Northwest currently relies on imports of power under so-called "critical water" conditions (1997 Pacific Northwest Loads and Resources Study, 1998). Second, the 1.6 cent projected cost is certainly at the very low end of conventional wisdom. Power Council modeling currently projects rates from 1.5 to 3.5 cents per kWh, depending on a range of possible future conditions, with the low- to mid-2 cents range considered most likely (Northwest Power Planning Council. "Analysis of the Bonneville Power Administration's Potential Future Cost and Revenues." Staff Analysis Report 98-11. June 1998, pages 23, 24). The DREW study will apparently use Power Council projections to quantify alternative generation costs. An increase in the cost of replacement power from $0.16/kWh to $0.25/kWh would increase the cost of replacement power from $115 million to over $180 million, erasing $65 million of the ONRC's calculated $86.7 million increase in economic welfare. This suggests that the ONRC conclusions are not robust in the face of uncertainty regarding future power costs.
If the dams are breached, a likely alternative generation source in the region is fossil fuel (e.g., natural gas) burning, which creates environmental concerns of its own. To make a balanced with-and-without comparison, one should add to the opportunity costs an estimate of the social costs of the increased carbon dioxide and particulates introduced into the atmosphere by increased combustion of natural gas. The Corps EIS is expected to note these carbon dioxide and particulate effects, but apparently will not attach an economic value to these effects.
Today's generation facilities also have economic and social value arising from their contribution to secondary energy, capacity, and power system reliability. (Information from NWPPC staff suggests that nonfirm energy generation may add almost 50% to the lost firm generation figures used by ONRC to get the $115.6 million figure.) If the actual value of lost power exceeds the $115.6 million replacement cost estimated by ONRC, this difference would reduce, and possibly reverse, ONRC's estimated net societal benefits of dam breaching. [3] Lost Net Crop Value and the Purchase Price of the Farms
Including both the lost net crop value and the purchase price of the farms double counts this loss. Either measure taken alone could be an estimate of what it would take to compensate the farmers for lost access to irrigation water. If we as a society decided to set up a program to purchase land currently in irrigated agriculture, the price we would be willing to pay should be no higher than the net value of the crops that could be grown on that land. The ONRC study used average crop values for counties adjacent to the Ice Harbor pool to estimate the lost net crop value, and estimated that the farmland could be purchased for $1500 per acre.
DREW is following two lines in its analysis of the impacts of drawdown on irrigation from the lower Snake. Initially DREW agreed to just look at the cost of mitigating the effects of drawdown by providing alternative pumping facilities, but has now expanded its analysis to include a brief look at net farm income as a way of estimating what it would cost to buy out the farms. Preliminary indications are that both net incomes and land values for some of the irrigated farmland supplied by pumps from the Ice Harbor pool may be quite high. Nearly a fifth of the land is in orchards or vineyards, where stand establishment can represent a $10,000 per acre investment. Nearly a quarter of the land is in hybrid poplar plantations. Preliminary indications are that DREW estimates of the cost of alternative pumping, and their estimates of lost farm income, will both greatly exceed the ONRC figures. Thus, although the ONRC report uses an approach that double-counts the value of land in irrigated agriculture, it may nonetheless understate the direct economic cost of removing the land from its current uses.
[4] Lost Potential Hydropower Generation from Water Used for Lockage
When a barge is passed through a lock, this uses water -- water that does not go through the turbines. The ONRC's treatment of this issue implicitly assumes the lost power potential will be recovered if the lower Snake dams are breached. However, while decreased barge traffic caused by the closure of the lower Snake navigation could possibly decrease barge traffic and lockage losses at downstream dams, the lost power potential at the breached dams themselves cannot be recovered. This logical flaw in the ONRC report is similar to that associated with lost hydropower, discussed above.
[5] Port Costs and Taxes
There are two issues with the port costs. First, to the extent these represent taxes used for recovery of investment costs in port facilities, they are "sunk" and cannot be recovered or avoided, even if the dams are breached. Second, not all "port costs" are related to river transportation and those related to rail and trucking may even increase with the loss of river navigation. The ONRC analysis is incomplete without this second effect.
[6] Lost Potential Hydropower Generation from Water Used for Irrigation
It is certainly true that diverting water for irrigation has resulted in less water through today's turbines, and less hydropower generation. However, removing the dams and turbines on the lower Snake will not recover the lost power generation there. Some power generation now lost at downriver projects may be recovered, unless there is increased irrigation on other Snake and Columbia River farms to make up the lost crop production. If some lost direct river water pumping is replaced by increased ground water pumping from aquifers linked to the river, this would also affect downstream flows and generation.
[7] Reduced Irrigation Electricity Price Subsidy
This small item also depends on whether the irrigation using subsidized electricity rates is replaced elsewhere in the region using similarly subsidized electric pumps. If it is, then breaching the lower Snake dams will not result in an avoided cost for society, and this component of the ONRC estimate should be eliminated.
[8] Reduced Crop Subsidies
There are two issues here. First, many of the crops grown at the farms in question are not subsidized crops. Second, assuming crop prices and therefore demand are unaffected, lost production will shift to other locations, probably within the U.S., and there will be no savings to national taxpayers at all. Thus, the ONRC study probably overstates the benefits of breaching dams in this area as well.
In measuring the net economic costs or benefits of the proposed natural river drawdown, crop program subsidies are mostly irrelevant. They are a transfer from taxpayers to farmers, and cancel out in national economic accounting. Admittedly, subsidies can lead to costs if they promote inefficient resource use. In terms of regional economic impacts, subsidies can contribute to regional income, at the expense of taxpayers elsewhere. However, the ONRC study did not examine these efficiency and equity effects.
DREW will apparently not include crop program subsidies in its analysis.
The IEAB concludes that the ONRC report suffers from a number of serious estimating problems. Two assumptions seem especially indefensible: (1) that all of the system costs and salmon recovery expenditures (including costs of fish related constraints on generation) will be ended when the dams are breached, and (2) that the power lost if the dams are breached can be measured by the lost firm energy only and can be replaced at only 1.6 cents per kWh. Both of these estimated savings are so important to the calculation, that even small changes could reduce or even reverse the estimated benefits of dam breaching.
The Lower Snake River Juvenile Salmon Migration Feasibility Study (DREW) is addressing most of the issues raised by the ONRC study, including the salmon recovery spending, cost of power from alternative sources, and costs avoided by breaching, which are so critical to the ONRC bottom line. Because the DREW process has been an open one, with opportunity for interest group involvement and peer review, we are optimistic that its methodology will be sound. We expect this to be the definitive analysis of the lower Snake drawdown alternative.